

Disclaimer

This book is introduced with a disclaimer as a speculative work. It would be wrong to say that it has not been researched, but that research was not done with the specific intent to write such a book. Thus, although it draws on and acknowledges the shoulders of those that have propped up our current era with their ideas, insights, and knowledge contributions throughout history, it is limited in terms of direct citations. There are three reasons for this. The first is the sheer magnitude of sources and synthesis that has gone into its creation. The second is that it is a philosophy of the future, and is constructed for a time that has yet to occur from a time that is at the forefront of the past (i.e. the present); writers of the 19th century, for example, are writing within their historical context and would know nothing of flight, the internet, globalization and the United Nations, and other such historical achievements that have occurred between their deaths and our current postmodern age. The third (which is related to the second) is that it attempts to strike out along a new conception of how the future of humanity should be conceived, the basis of which I call *long history*.

What is a Deductive Philosophy of the Future?

Foundations

To construct a deductive philosophy of the future, one must start in the present and consider the past. It is not quite the famous quote by Georges Santayana about being condemned to repeat a past that one does not learn from. It is rather because there is no point in describing a future that is not achievable from the present. Metaphorically, one can think of it like Philip Pettit's Twin Towers highwire act. If there is no initial contact between future and present, there is no means by which humanity can get from one state of being to the other. In such a case, one is essentially writing fiction. In addition, one must take into consideration how the present has sprung from the past via *praxis* in order to conceive of how a future might be constructed from the present. Future history (that is, the history yet to be written between a hypothetical point in the future and the present) like past history is a dynamical system, though one that is far more complex than those that can be calculated mathematically. Still, it is necessary to understand and consider what human beings are capable of for otherwise, again, one is writing only fiction.

In this sense, the main means of construction will be, on the one hand, three basic questions of philosophy—who are we? (ontology), what do we know? (epistemology), and what should we do? (essentialism / existentialism)—and on the other hand, it will borrow the tools of the philosophy of history, i.e. hermeneutics, dialecticism, and historicism. Classically, hermeneutics dealt solely with the interpretation of scripture, but

it has been developed more recently to focus on the historical and existential content of its production, which is the intention in this work. Dialecticism is the Hegelian / Marxian interpretation of historical process as resolving a historically posited and carried thesis—either behavioural or communicated—with a paradigmatic antithesis that synthesizes a new reality free of the previous constraint. Finally, historicism is the umbrella term that maintains that all human events are dependent on their historical context, not just passively, but actively and scientifically so.

Because these three questions reflect a philosophy of the present, they will be modified to encompass a philosophy of the future—who must we be?, what must we know?, and what must we do? More specifically, it asks two fundamental questions, *what must we be?* (ontological), and *how do we get there?* (existential). The latter question cannot be essentialist because this would imply that we merely need to keep being what we are in order to achieve this future state of being, and there would be no point in developing a philosophy of the future except as a mere prediction of a process that cannot be modified, only observed and recorded while marking time. Further, this difficulty with essentialism does not necessarily posit free will over determinism. It merely suggests that substantial further work must be done to bring about a paradigm shift in our future historical trajectory that is markedly different than a past that consists predominantly of evolving forms of feudal classism and the forced extraction of worth from an underclass to prop up a self-defined and self-reinforced aristocracy. In other words, the intention of this book is to provide a meaningful and constructable means by which the gap between

the haves and have-nots is sufficiently closed. This is not to say that a utopian world of boring equality posited by Thomas More and satirized by Nietzsche's Last Man is the target. Rather, the goal for the future would be to create a world where *the historical conditions that one is borne into do not matter*.

Let us unpack this statement sufficiently. When anyone is borne into the world, they inherit a set of historical conditions that they do not choose but are held against them for their entire life. Those conditions traditionally used to foment inequality include those that are tribal—country of origin, skin colour and other physical examples of difference, religion or political ideology, etc.—and those that are familial—wealth, status, educational background, etc. The future society that is desired would not be one where all tribes and families have equal resources, as this is not feasible when environmental conditions are brought into play. Those living in the frozen north could not expect to have the same agricultural resources as those living in a temperate zone, for example. Furthermore, any society should expect that (whether deterministic or not), Sartre's thrownness principle should still take precedence: one should always be held responsible for one's actions. Certain interpretations of the idea that everyone should have similar resources would imply that one would be free to risk said resources and expect to be reimbursed for losses. This would not only be unwise, but it in fact is closer to the realities of the feudal society that we are trying to leave behind.

In other words, the desired future would involve targeting a sweet spot between the banality of the risk-averse Last Man where actions have no consequences and everybody is beaten into

submission to some sort of regulatory algorithm of life—for then what is the point of living at all?—and the current regime where one’s future success is highly dependent on one’s origins. We would know when we had achieved such a future when an individual born lame in, say, Somalia has the same prospects as the athletically gifted individual born in, say, Canada. This is not, of course, to say that both should be able to star in an athletic competition, but rather that there is *an equality of opportunity to thrive* (potentiality) *doing something that will contribute to the growth of the individual* (ontology) *and the furthering of the historical conditions of the individual’s community* (historicity), to what geographical and / or demographical ‘community’ may be defined.

In sum, the three philosophical questions that were originally asked (and slightly altered to consider the future rather than the present) should be translated from ontological, epistemological, and existential to ontological, historical, and potential. Specifically, it is necessary to translate the current episteme of ahistorical capitalist development into historical futurist development, and with this, questions surrounding tradition existential topics of being and death into potentiality. Thus, what we should come to know is our own history on both a personal and species scale, however unfortunate and tragic it may be. To do so, we must *confront ourselves* without the cerebral tricks of ahistorical avoidance, the result being epistemology + history = totalism. In addition, questions surrounding death should be translated to potentiality by *living in the present for the future* as a

species-being. It is argued that achieving these results would complete Sartre's *Search for a Method*.

Methodology

For the purposes of this book, a deductive, speculative philosophy of the future implies that what is desired is to be able to deduce a temporally optimal path to get humanity from the present to the goal described above. To do so must be based on speculation because a future to be achieved has not been described or defined yet within human reality. Whether this occurs ten, one hundred, one thousand years from now or not at all, that future history is yet to be lived and yet to perturb the future path of humanity. If the methodology is to be historical, then it must acknowledge that future history will have a major impact on human values, practices, desires, etc., and none of this can be predicted with any sort of accuracy.

The means by which such a deductive philosophy should be conjectured (as it is at best a best hypothesis that the future will be measured against scientifically) is via a series of "Icarus points". That is, once the question "who must we be?" is decided, an optimal path can be deduced by calculating backwards dialectically by looking at what parameters of that future humanity we lack, how they could be brought about, and in what order they should be brought about in order to make the most of our human potentiality.

This notion of an Icarus point borrows from the mythology of the boy who had wings fashioned by Daedalus only to fly too close to the sun, have the wax from his wings melt, and fall to his

death. In the present sense, it is to devise a paradigmatical point where society goes from not having a property X to having that property. In this sense, it may be easiest to work from Schopenhauer's three stages of truth: i) it is ignored, ii) it is vehemently opposed, iii) it is accepted as self-evident. The Icarus point is therefore the transition from ii) to iii) of a desired property of future humanity that it does not have at present.

Program

There are thus four segments to such a philosophy of the future. First, it is necessary to understand who we are at present. Second, it is necessary to define a gettable version of humanity that can be built towards and would encompass the properties described above. Third, it is necessary to devise an optimal set of points that humanity must dialectically reach for a synthesis of thesis and antithesis can bring it to a higher phase of existence. Fourth and finally, it is necessary to order these points and suggest broadly defined programs that would allow humanity to reach such points in as optimal a manner (temporally, resourcefully, and environmentally) as possible given what we know about humanity, its desires, and its value systems in the present.

The goal of the present work is to present a "totalist" version of human reality as a hypothetical ground state of human reality related to a higher future state as explained above. Beyond that, it is itself presented as a scientific hypothesis of being (which relates to its speculative nature). If in the future there are ideas that challenge it, it will either be marked as needing modifications or being discarded entirely. As a point of guidance as one of my

mentors, although speculative, the intent is to develop an argument that will stand up against the strongest possible counterarguments through a narrative that is as plausible as possible.